ince the 1980s, the information industry has become the paramount engine of economic growth in Taiwan. Whilst many countries have experienced rapid development of their information sectors over the past two decades, the growth of Taiwan's information industry has outpaced the majority of its international counterparts, making Taiwan the world's third largest producer of information products. A characteristic feature of Taiwan's information industry is its local industrial clustering. This feature, which has already been well documented (Hobday 1995; Kraemer et al. 1996; Kim and Tunzelmann 1998) , is often cited as the source of Taiwan's success.
Our analysis proceeds in the following way. We begin with an examination of the increasing importance of inter-rm linkages and the emergence of global production and knowledge networks, including a brief discussion of the role of IT in GPNs. We then turn to an analysis of the way in which IT production and application interact within global networks, followed by an examination of the personal computer (PC) and integrated chip (IC) industries. Each section incorporates an in-depth case study as a means of highlighting and elaborating on the points made. We conclude with an examination of the potential implications of our ndings.
GLOBALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS
In a departure from standard economic theory which tends to portray rms as vertically integrated, cross-national industries are increasingly linking up along the value chain and across industrial boundaries. The limitations of standard economic theory in accounting for the increasing complexity of industrial organization are clearly revealed in Schumpeter's discussion of the relationship between technological innovation and industrial organization. Schumpeter's well-known concept of ''creative destruction'' emphasizes the role of small technological rms or innovative entrepreneurs in challenging both large established rms and existing technologies with radical technological breakthroughs-the Mark I scenario. However, Schumpeter (1942) also recognized that established rms may be in a better position to appropriate new knowledge by such means as patents, secrecy, lead times, and superior sales efforts. This would result in the Mark II scenario, characterized by high market concentration and the continuing existence of large established rms. Schumpeter's Mark I/Mark II analysis, however, falls short of capturing the full complexity of technology and its effects on industrial structure, particularly in the area of IT. As Windrum (1999) argues, innovations such as e-commerce involve technical systems that are inherently large, comprising a set of jointly consumed interdependent products. Because of network effects and product compatibility, successful innovations for technical systems entail intensive interfaces between multiple actors with different knowledge and skills bases, or ''innovation networks''. By implication, not only does such innovation often result from the collective efforts of interrelated rms, but it also demonstrates that the value chain does not need to be completely internalized within individual rms. Therefore in many cases, industrial competition takes place between rival technological and production networks that contain a multiplicity of differentiated rms, rather than between vertically integrated oligopolists. The production networks literature, however, tends to focus mainly on networks woven by rms in advanced industrial countries (for example Delapierre and Mytelka 1998) , whilst downplaying the role played by rms in newly industrialized countries such as Taiwan.
The trend towards globalization has been largely responsible for this reshaping of the industrial competition landscape. One outcome of globalization over the last few decades has been the increasing disintegration of capabilities in production, and even innovation, across nations (Freenstra 1998) . Driven by this disintegration, the outreach of multinationals not only takes the form of direct investment, but also of outsourcing of production, and even knowledge. As a result, boundaries between rms have become blurred on an international scale, which has eroded the basis for the formation of traditional oligopolies. Industrial rivalry now tends to occur amongst industrial networks comprising of a multiplicity of rms linked up with different knowledge bases. Although well-established rms in the advanced nations tend to occupy the driving seat in these networks, rms in countries such as Taiwan also play an important role.
Against this background, offshore sourcing is increasingly being adopted by many American rms-and more recently by Japanese rms-in their efforts to come to terms with the new global industrial dynamics (Venkatesan 1992; Swamidass and Kotabe 1993; Kotabe 1996; Chen and Ku 2000) . Many brand marketers thus tend to concentrate their core competencies on brand-name resources and R&D, whilst outsourcing the remainder of the value chain. As a result, former vertically integrated multinationals are increasingly becoming hollowed-out corporations (Kotabe 1989) .
On the other hand, a new breed of multinationals has emerged, such as contract electronics manufacturers (CEMs). CEM companies such as Solectron or Flextronics (see Lüthje this issue), unlike the more traditional manufacturers and multinationals, do not make their own brand-name products, instead deploying global networks with fast-response capabilities to provide production and other (mainly logistics) services to brand marketers. Taiwan's PC industry has similarly evolved from a local production network towards a global one.
Global production networks have had similar implications for the IC industry. By disintegrating the IC value chain, the initial emergence of foundry services in Taiwan facilitated the proliferation of small and medium-sized rms engaged in other market segments, such as IC design, testing, and packaging, giving rise to a vertically disintegrated industrial structure. Moreover, the emergence of system-on-a-chip (SOC) technology has induced the modularization of various design technologies, or silicon intellectual properties (SIPs), which can be used repetitively as the main building block for SOC designs. This trend has given rise to 'chipless' IC rms, acting as pure providers of SIP without owning a fab, or even a chip, leading to further disintegration of the industry. As a result, IC design and production has come to resemble a modular process utilizing SIP modules as the building blocks (see Figure 1) .
Although most SIPs are owned by integrated device manufacturers (IDMs), fabless rms-and increasingly, chipless foundry service providers-are the natural places to verify the value and ''fabricability'' of SIP designs. Therefore, in order to go through the entire value chain, the industry is required to bring together a variety of industry players, including chipless rms, design service providers, IC designers, electronic design aid (EDA) tool providers, and foundry and packaging rms, who are likely to be located in a number of different nations. The production networks in the industry are thus global, or at least international, in nature.
So what role does IT play in these GPNs? IT can be considered an innovation of 'transaction' technology, which can facilitate intra-and inter-organizational value chain management in a real-time and cost-effective manner (Economist Intelligence Unit 2000) . The use of IT in conjunction with the reshuf ing of business models can help rms achieve speed and exibility in an industry where time is critical (Kraemer et al. 2000). In this regard, IT is more than a transaction facilitator, and in fact, is promoted as an enabling technology for collaborative commerce amongst rms, involving not only inter-organizational coordination of the supply chain but also cooperation in product de nition, design, and R&D (Berryman and Heck 2001) . In this way, production networks in the ''bricks and mortar'' world may be transformed into virtual supply networks and collaborative communities. This is not to suggest that industrial advantages derived from the physical world will become dispensable, but rather, as will be shown below, that they can go hand in hand with IT applications to bolster the prospects of the rms involved.
GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND IT-THE PC INDUSTRY
In 1999, Taiwan was the world's third largest producer of PC-related products, with a signi cant number of Taiwanese-made products such as motherboards, scanners, monitors, and notebook computers enjoying a healthy global market share. Taiwan's characteristic local industrial clusters and their role in the growth of the PC industry in Taiwan have been well scrutinized (Hobday 1995; Kawakami 1996; Kraemer et al. 1996) , but as noted earlier, local agglomeration alone can no longer adequately account for the dynamics of Taiwan's PC industry. This is mainly because the way in which the global PC industry is organized has changed, bringing GPNs to the fore. An important milestone in the development of Taiwan's PC industry in this regard was the outreach achieved by local rms starting from the late 1980s. Their outward investment was initially directed towards Southeast Asia, but more recently towards mainland China and elsewhere in the world. The offshore production of Taiwan-based PC rms grew from US$973 million in 1992 to US$18.86 billion in 1999, which at that time, represented over 47 percent of total production. It follows that the volume of export orders received by local rms has increasingly diverged from their actual exports. According to our observations, the divergence widened signi cantly in 1997, due mainly to the changing role of Taiwanese rms in the GPN (Chen and M.C. Liu 2002) .
The PC industry's drive towards the reduction of lead time to market, along with lower production and inventory costs, brought about a profound change in the manufacturing system and inter-rm competition within the industry; it became commonplace for components to be sourced from a global network of suppliers and for nal assembly to be undertaken in the end-market (Angel and Engstrom 1995; Borrus and Borrus 1997) . More speci cally, major brand marketers moved to adopt outsourcing and order-based production, which greatly rationalized their global supply chain, thus altering their contractual relationships with Taiwanese rms. Compaq for example pioneered the so-called ''optimized distribution model'' which, in essence, was aimed at allowing customers to choose what they wanted, when, and how, at the lowest prices. There are three facets to this operational model. Firstly, in order to narrow the gap between supply and demand, production must be ''build-to-order'' (BTO), based on meeting orders rather than forecasts. Secondly, in order to meet the wide variety of consumer demands, producers must not only BTO but also con gureto-order, making customized products in speci c quantities. Thirdly, vendors must undertake nal assembly, bringing together a set of subassemblies produced and delivered by subcontractors. Compaq imposes a ''98-3'' operational formula on subcontractors, requiring them to collect 98 percent of the components and parts needed for production within 3 days of the order and to ship the product within 6 days of receipt of the order.
Such contractual arrangements with global leaders in the PC industry prompted Taiwanese IT rms to upgrade their position within the global production system; these rms have subsequently taken on the essential functions of coordinating the global supply chain for their original equipment manufacturer (OEM) customers. For example, under its new business model, Compaq outsourced every element of the value chain, with the exception of marketing, to Taiwanese subcontractors. By so doing, the company completely handed over its inventory costs to these subcontractors, who were also required to produce and deliver sub-system products on tight schedules and in tune with the vagaries of market demand. The Taiwanese rms had to ensure that everything was synchronized up and down the supply chain. In order to do this they had to participate in cross-border supply chain management, logistics operations, and after-sales services, coordinating all of these functions through the formation of a fast-response global production and logistics network or ''global logistics'' (Chen and Liu 1999) . The case of Mitac provides a useful illustration of these points.
Mitac International Corporation is one of Taiwan's leading PC manufacturing services companies, producing over 10 million PCs in 2000, and accounting for around 8 percent of global production. According to Forbes magazine, Mitac was recognized as the 495th largest company in the world in the year 2000, as compared with the 607th in 1999, achieving revenues of US$5.274 billion in 2000. According to the company's website, its current remarkable performance can be attributed to long-term efforts in areas such as supply chain management, global logistics, vertically integrated manufacturing services, as well as aggressive adoption of e-commerce and other Internet-based mechanisms to enhance operational ef ciency and create new business opportunities.
The rm now maintains manufacturing/assembly sites in Taiwan, mainland China, the USA, Japan, Belgium and the UK.
Mitac's strategic restructuring, with a global logistics and e-commerce bent, started in the early 1990s; however, during 1992 and 1993, the company suffered serious losses because of the oversupply of PC components and parts. The underlying cause of this problem was the in exibility of the then system-integrated production under one roof in Taiwan, leading to overstocking. In response, Mitac pioneered the Modulus Manufacturing System under which the PC, as a system, was divided into different moduli to enable fast-food style production, the ultimate purpose being BTO. Its partnership with Compaq, a global leading brand-name marketer, has facilitated Mitac's large-scale deployment of global logistics and e-commerce.
Mitac has put signi cant effort into recon guring its international production and logistics network in order to serve Compaq's global operations (see Figure 2 ). In 1998, Mitac began setting up a materials hub in Hsinchu, Taiwan, within which its main production site is located. This materials hub stocks parts and components for producing bare-bones, mainly from its own suppliers, who have to bear inventory and warehousing costs before Mitac gives a green light for delivery for production. As soon as all the parts and components arrive at the production site, they are manufactured into bare-bones, which are then immediately shipped, normally by sea, to overseas assembly sites. This process has enabled Mitac to substantially reduce its inventory risks, whilst its suppliers, in return, get better payment terms and swifter nancing services from Mitac.
In an effort to meet Compaq's con gure-to-order practices, Mitac has also set up a number of con guration hubs close to its overseas assembly sites located in major international market areas. These con guration hubs serve to stock key and pricesensitive parts and components such as CPUs and RAMs. The overseas assembly sites undertake the nal assembly function, bringing together bare-bones delivered from Mitac's manufacturing sites and key parts and components from con guration hubs. Compaq dominates the operation of the con guration hubs, using its bargaining power to gain better prices for the key parts and components.
In addition, Mitac has established a number of ful llment centers in the major market areas in order to broaden its value chain. Since price competition has intensi ed and pro t margins have narrowed for most mature PC products, Mitac can no longer act as a pure manufacturer to sustain its long-term development. By setting up the ful llment centers, Mitac has begun to shoulder the responsibility for aftersales services for Compaq. The returns are not only nancial, but also technical, because it has helped Mitac to gain direct feedback for its product designs and production.
However, these ful llment centers are likely to be reduced to after-sales service outposts, functioning simply to replace out-of-order parts and components, as Mitac has already started to build up a large-scale repair and maintenance plant in mainland China. This will help Mitac to utilize the cheap labor available in China without sacri cing the quality of its after-sales services and the technical gains already noted.
Such contractual arrangements also entail progressive deployment of e-commerce links between Mitac and its vertical and horizontal counterparts. In fact, it was Compaq's rule of ''no electronic data interchange (EDI), no order'' that prompted Mitac to embark upon the application of e-commerce. Moreover, a governmental initiative aimed at promoting e-commerce links between Taiwanese rms and their international customers (known as the TaiWeb Project in Compaq's case) 1 has facilitated the electronic links between Compaq and Mitac (as well as a few other Taiwanese rms) migrating in part from an EDI base to an Internet base.
By means of EDI, Mitac is electronically linked with Compaq and its own suppliers. Sales forecasts from Compaq are transmitted to Mitac periodically with weekly adjustments, termed a ''rolling plan''. On this basis, Mitac puts forward its own manufacturing plans, inventory buffering and stock level requirements to its suppliers. Following these information ows, Mitac's international production and logistics networks, mentioned above, assume their role in meeting tight production and delivery schedules and the variety of market demands. The second phase of the TaiWeb Project (known as the ''B Plan'' Project) will extend the e-commerce applications of all the parties involved from supply chain management to other transaction-related activities such as payment and warranty services. In addition, Mitac is to develop a 'virtual' materials hub mechanism over the Internet. The ultimate purpose is to get rid of physical warehouses, eliminating inventory costs on both sides of the transaction. This has to be based on strong mutual trust and commitment between Mitac and its suppliers.
Mitac has also set up a collaborative product commerce (CPC) mechanism for online joint product design. It incorporates an intra-link that enables all the parties involved to use the same design tools for joint product design and development, ranging from product de nition, to product R&D and product modularization. This not only helps to reduce the R&D cycle time for Mitac and its partners, it is also essential to the coordination of the production, assembly, delivery and repair and maintenance activities that follow.
Although driven by brand-name marketers (such as Compaq), Mitac has now electronically linked both its inter-rm and intra-rm value chain activities. Over the electronics network, multilateral and timely information ows and sharing have, on balance, been greatly enhanced, facilitating effective synchronization both up and down the inter-organizational and international supply chain. By so doing, Mitac and its partners are now involved in design collaboration, commodity management, supplier rationalization and supply collaboration which strengthen not only their transaction ef ciency but also their learning and innovative capabilities.
A signi cant change brought about by the global logistics practice, or more speci cally, BTO, is the substantial increase in the frequency of ordering and hence rising speed of delivery. In the past, it took 40-60 days for PC rms to go through the entire transaction process, from order to delivery. Under BTO, however, subcontractors such as Mitac, have to meet a tightened schedule of 5-7 days, or even 2-3 days. In addition, patchy production, instead of mass production, has become the dominant practice. Modular manufacturing and IT networking is therefore indispensable to Mitac's formation of a rapid-response global production and logistics network. From Taiwan's perspective, the essence of this development is that local IT rms, like Mitac, are transforming from stand-alone OEM manufacturers into providers of integrated service packages encompassing a wide range of value chain activities. This development is particularly signi cant in terms of an often-neglected aspect of high-technology manufacturing. High-technology manufacturing industries, like the PC industry, are widely regarded as high value-added; however, they tend to be vulnerable to accelerating competition and narrowing pro t margins even before reaching the mature stage of the product life cycle because of the rapid changes in technology. As a result, rms and nations that rely heavily on high-technology hardware manufacturing can be easily caught up in deteriorating trading terms. In addition, most of Taiwan's IT rms undertake OEM/original design manufacturing (ODM) contract work without any strong ability to control, or even gain direct access to, the nal market. Their outreach, by means of moving elements of their manufacturing and/or assembly functions overseas, implies that they have to generate additional pro ts through the widening of their value chains. In the case of global logistics, they have begun to shoulder service functions such as the coordination of cross-border supply chain and logistics, in addition to their initial manufacturing function. It is therefore arguable that they have looked beyond manufacturing pro ts to seek pro ts from the services they provide to brand-name marketers. In fact, a study by the Central Bank in Taiwan reveals that global logistics contracting contributed 0.85 percent to Taiwan's GDP growth in 1999.
Furthermore, central to global logistics is the subcontractor's ability to weave together the cross-national constituent elements of the value chain into a competitive, effective, and rapidly responsive production and logistics system. Competitive advantage in the PC industry derives not merely from lower costs, but more from rapid response capabilities and exibility. Although Taiwanese IT rms are not in the driving seat, they have proved themselves capable of taking part in setting up the rules of the game. Therefore, with a global production and logistics network at their disposal that is capable of satisfactorily meeting the needs of their customers, Taiwan-based IT rms may preempt the entry into the network of their counterparts in many countries. As a result, from Taiwan's point of view, many of the owners of world-class PC brand names, which are international core rms in the industry, can be ''anchored'' to Taiwan's economy (Chen and D.N. Liu 2000) .
Mitac has also made substantial performance improvements. For example, Mitac's inventory turnover rate increased from 3.53 in 1993 to 12.71 in 1998. At the same time, immediately after its materials and con gurations hubs were set up, its inventory cycle time was reduced substantially from 103.4 to 30 days. The company also managed to achieve Compaq's 95-5 operation formula targets in 1997 and is well on the way to the next milestone, the 98-3 operation formula targets.
The Mitac experience shows that global logistics and e-commerce need to be accompanied by a reshuf ing of the business model in order to come to terms with the local rm's position in the international industrial network and industrial dynamics. The business model in question needs to address both internal and external aspects of the industrial value chain. Moreover, whilst reciprocity or mutual forbearance is essential to the operation of global logistics, industrial muscle with suf cient bargaining power remains indispensable to the negotiation processes involved.
VERTICAL DISINTEGRATION AND VIRTUAL INTEGRATION-THE IC INDUSTRY
Taiwan's IC industry is currently the fourth largest in the world, behind only the USA, Japan and Korea, however, the industry in Taiwan differs from those of the other three in several ways. Unlike Korea, which specializes in the production of dynamic random access memory (DRAM), Taiwan produces a much wider variety of IC chips whilst also dominating in foundry services, capturing around 70 percent of global market share. In addition, in contrast to the vertically integrated conglomerates dominating the industry in Korea and Japan, Taiwan's IC industry consists of many small rms specializing in a narrow range of the value chain, such as IC design, mask production, foundry service, packaging, and testing (TSMC 2001) . In fact, Taiwan's ock of some 127 IC design houses puts it second only to the USA in terms of the number of companies operating in this segment. In a sense, Taiwan's IC industry is organized as an industrial network system with a strong connection to Silicon Valley, the global center of IC technology and the IC market.
As the author has documented elsewhere (Chen and M.C. Liu 2000; Chen et al. 2002) , Taiwan's IC industry has, to a large extent, come to resemble the exible specialization scenario (Piore and Sable 1984) . In short, fabless IC design houses proliferated in Taiwan partly because access to external fabrication capacity lowered the barriers to entry into the IC design market. In addition, the concentration of IC and computer-related rms in the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park generated agglomeration effects that allowed these rms to exploit the bene ts of proximity and outsourcing. Therefore, even though they specialize in only one segment of the value chain, IC rms in Taiwan are networked by social and business connections. It is also evident that Taiwan's IC industry is closely connected to the industry center in Silicon Valley in terms of business and knowledge linkages (ibid.). Underlying this are the trans-Paci c social and business networks (Saxenian 1997; Kim and Tunzelmann 1998) and the similarity of industrial structures between Silicon Valley and Hsinchu (Saxenian 1997) .
For the purposes of this paper, the author would like to argue further that such industrial networking as exists in Taiwan's IC industry has also bene ted from recent innovations in IT. Firstly, by reducing the uncertainty and transaction costs involved in purchasing from the best outsiders, IT reduces large rms' advantages of centralized purchasing and in-house suppliers. Secondly, technological changes have resulted in smaller production runs, increasing the feasibility of product changes and allowing small, specialized rms to exploit fragmented product markets on the basis of their exible response. In addition, the IC industry is following the PC industry in moving rapidly towards order-based production. Leading IC rms in Taiwan are championing the concept of the ''virtual factory'' by deploying the Internet and extranet to electronically link with their customers and suppliers. The case of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), presented below, demonstrates this point.
TSMC may be regarded as a major catalyst in the abovementioned evolution of the industry. The company was created to function as a dedicated foundry service provider, simply carrying out contract fabrication work for global customers ranging from start-up ventures to world-leading IDMs. Therefore, customer relationship management, as well as fabrication capacity and capability, were always central to TSMC's operations, in which e-commerce has come to play an increasingly important role.
TSMC adopted e-business in 1995 with the introduction of total order management (TOM) as a tool for bridging supply and demand in fabrication, and for order and production scheduling. TSMC has also formed electronic links with its suppliers by implementing continuous replenishment programming in order to minimize its inventory costs; however, these can only be considered the most basic elements of TSMC's ''extended'' supply chain management.
In the ''arms-length'' relationship between foundries and fabless design houses, it is essential to manage the ow of knowledge so as to facilitate a smooth and ef cient transfer of new designs into production. This has been made possible by the design rm's adherence to ''design rules'' laid out by the foundry, namely, restrictions on the type of designs that will be manufactured in the foundry on a speci c delivery schedule. These design rules are determined by the foundry's manufacturing capacity and capability. In light of this, foundries such as TSMC have become an essential node of the innovation network of new IC designs, which entails close interactions of knowledge and information between foundries and their customers. As a result, in 1996 TSMC initiated the concept of the ''virtual fab'' in order to promote virtual integration with its customers by means of business-to-business (B2B) applications, thus rendering TSMC the facilitator of its customers' supply chain management.
Apart from regular online business transactions, TSMC's B2B, under a total package of ''eFoundry'' covers three major aspects: logistics, engineering, and design collaborations (see Figure 3 ). TSMC's eFoundry consists of a suite of Internet-based applications providing its customers with real-time support in wafer design, engineering and logistics, functioning as the master tool for the concept of the virtual fab. It currently supports ve online services, including TSMC-Online (updated to version 3.0), TSMCDirect, TSMC-YES (Yield Enhancement System), TSMC-ILV (Internet Layout Viewer), and eJobView.
In terms of collaboration in logistics, TSMC-Online provides access to real-time production and logistics information updates in areas such as the status of wafer fabrication, assembly and testing, as well as order handling and shipping. As for engineering collaboration, TSMC-Online provides a variety of engineering capabilities, including interactive views of prototyping, lot status, yield analysis and quality reliability data. It is also empowered with design collaboration capabilities in support of customer access to important information needed during the design process. Aided by Design Service Alliance, to which we shall return later, TSMC-Online provides selected blocks of intellectual property (IP) owned by third parties-these are robust design solutions that conform to TSMC's production technologies-which are then made available to designers.
For service coverage, TSMC-Direct is similar to TSMC-Online, but whilst the latter is open to wider access, since it is Internet-based, the former is a system-to-system and business-process-to-business-process information link that transmits and receives mission-critical information between the enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems of TSMC and its customers. TSMC-Direct acts as an extension of customers' own internal systems enabling collaborative planning, work in progress (WIP) tracking, engineering data sharing, real-time order placement, con rmation and other important business control features.
Through the use of TSMC-YES, TSMC's customers can perform yield enhancement analysis remotely from their workstations or PCs using exactly the same tools, data and models as those employed by TSMC's engineers. This aims to promote engineering collaboration between TSMC and its customers in order to achieve shorter yield analysis cycles, improved yield enhancement ef ciencies and faster ramp to production. In addition, TSMC-ILV and eJobView are speci cally instrumental in design collaboration. TSMC-ILV is a real-time web-based distributed layout information viewing service providing an engineering collaboration platform for communicating on layout issues.
Through these means, designers can interactively review, navigate, highlight and discuss layout issues with TSMC's service engineers. As a result, it may be possible to achieve improved design productivity, lower engineering and debugging costs, and faster time to market.
TSMC's eJobView is a mask inspection software system-the rst of its kind in the foundry industry-which allows external customers to view mask images anytime or anywhere through their preferred web browser. Foundry mask data sign-off previously involved several days of inspection and discussion, and even expensive air travel costs for international customers. By contrast, through the use of eJobView, mask image inspection is immediate, with remote teams now able to discuss critical projects in real time, leading to faster time to tape-out, lower development costs, and faster time to volume.
In order to facilitate design collaboration, TSMC has also formed a Design Service Alliance (DSA) with third parties. As mentioned earlier, the emergence of SOC has highlighted the importance of SIPs, and as a result, IC design has come to resemble the assembly of SIPs, from both internal and external sources. Design houses are also faced with the challenge of choosing from amongst a variety of library suppliers and EDA tools. TSMC previously functioned as a pure-play foundry with limited design service capacity, but with DSA, the company can now mobilize external resources to facilitate the design processes of its customers.
Design Service Alliance encompasses the four service areas that make up the IC design process-third party libraries, silicon-veri ed IPs, experienced IC designers and proven EDA software. A network of leading third party library vendors form the core of the Library Alliance enabling TSMC's customers to gain access to required technical services, leading edge process-speci c technologies and documents on design requirements. IP Alliance encompasses a large category of silicon-veri ed and production-proven foundry speci c IPs, which are useful for designers in IP assembly.
Through the DSA, TSMC helps its customers to connect to a global network of quali ed and experienced IC design centers in order to gain the necessary design expertise. Similarly, through the EDA Alliance, TSMC's design service engineers work with EDA Alliance members in order to deliver TSMC-speci c technology les and design kits that may simplify its customers' design experience. In essence, the DSA as a whole aims to provide TSMC's customers with total IC design solutions to accelerate cycle time from speci cation, through tape-out, to nished wafers. Both TSMC's customers and the key testing and packaging rms can gain access to the DSA using TSMC-Online as the platform.
TSMC's customer services have also been extended to collaboration on prototyping through CyberShuttle. First launched in October 1998, CyberShuttle allows multiple customers to share the costs of a single mask set and prototype in a pilot run. It aims to help customers to reduce substantially their non-recurring engineering charges for small wafer volume, providing fast and cost-effective prototyping. According to TSMC, CyberShuttle will launch 93 multi-project wafers during 2001, with the rst half alone almost matching the 50 shuttles launched throughout the whole of 2000.
To summarize, whilst starting out as a stand-alone OEM foundry, TSMC has come to resemble a provider of integrated service packages covering a wide range of value chain management activities thanks to its extensive application of e-commerce. Basically, through its arms-length relationship with its customers, TSMC is not just a pure manufacturer, it has become the natural place to verify the manufacturability of its customers' designs and to ensure the quality and timely delivery of their nished wafers. The ability of the electronic Internet and e-commerce links to accelerate and broaden information transfer between TSMC and its customers not only helps to simplify their tasks of knowledge management and exchange, but also induces TSMC to widen the scope of its extended supply chain management activities.
In a sense, the method of e-commerce employed by TSMC, or more speci cally TSMC-Online, acts as a portal providing comprehensive support for its customers' major operational tasks, ranging from prototyping and design, to engineering and logistics. In terms of design, aided by its B2B Internet applications, TSMC has drawn on a portfolio of design solutions from third parties to help its customers achieve better designs, more reliable design reuse and faster time to market, leading to virtual integration of a network of rms.
In TSMC's B2B e-commerce model, goods and cash ows are secondary to information ows. As a pure-play foundry, its inventory costs for nished products are not an important issue, whereas in contrast, customer relationship management is regarded as central to TSMC's operations as a means of securing its rates of capacity utilization and pro tability. In addition, from their own viewpoint, B2B e-commerce is essential in order for foundries to come to terms with the trend towards SOC. Therefore, TSMC's e-commerce initiatives aim to meet the diverse needs of its customers, in order to enhance customer loyalty.
Whereas it is possible to identify the operational impact of TSMC's e-commerce, its strategic signi cance has to be interpreted in a wider context of inter-rm relationships. In operational terms, TSMC was able to deliver WIP reports three times a day in 1998, whilst a Korean counterpart at that time managed to do this only once a week. Nowadays, TSMC's WIP reporting is real time. In addition, thanks to e-commerce, order con rmation in TSMC can now be completed in 2 seconds, as compared with 2 days in the past. Furthermore, TSMC's e-commerce applications enable it to provide tailored packages for its customer that include design support, cell library, IP, quality/reliability as well as process technology and wafer capacity. As a result, its customers can ''virtually'' own a foundry, providing a total solution, by leveraging TSMC's internal and external resources. In this way, TSMC has set the rules of the game for the industry, which dictate that a foundry must go beyond manufacturing muscle to become an essential platform for its customers to gain access to across-the-board competencies. The case of TSMC proves that e-commerce applications can be a fertile ground for building up this new competitive advantage.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Taiwan's achievements in high-tech production are best understood as the outcome of local rms' abilities to leverage and align local and international networks. The industrial structures of the island's PC and IC sectors are both characterized by vertical disintegration but with strong linkages between local rms and across national borders. The agglomeration effect of industrial clusters helps to create the momentum for the development of local industries in Taiwan and, to the extent that the local networks become part of the global network, the local industries are given additional impetus for development. More importantly, the use of IT has helped these Taiwanese rms to closely integrate themselves into the GPNs. The two cases of Mitac and TSMC differ in a variety of ways. Firstly, in the case of Mitac, brand marketers such as Compaq took the initiative in shaping the GPN and in deploying IT integration within it. In contrast, TSMC appeared to play a more active role in this respect, since the company considered virtual integration an evitable response to the emerging call for SOC. Secondly, in terms of inter-organizational and cross-border supply chain integration, goods ows are no less important than information ows in the case of Mitac, and for the PC industry in general. However, for TSMC, such goods ows are secondary to information ows. This helps to explain why TSMC chose to take part in managing global production and knowledge networks, even though its production function is currently concentrated in Taiwan.
Nonetheless, the two organizations do have some things in common. First of all, both of the companies have evolved from stand-alone OEM manufacturers towards providers of integrated service packages encompassing a wider range of value chain activities than manufacturing. By ne-tuning its international operations in a global logistics way and aided by IT application, Mitac has begun to shoulder service functions such as the coordination of cross-border supply chains and logistics. Similarly, TSMC exploits its unique position in the IC industry to act as a portal providing comprehensive support for its customers' major operational tasks, ranging from prototyping, design and engineering, to logistics. In so doing, both organizations have become essential nodes in their respective GPNs.
Of equal importance is the formation of the GPNs that have resulted in new rules of the games for the two industries, to which both Mitac and TSMC have contributed in part. Central to global logistics is the subcontractors' ability to weave together the cross-national constituent elements of the value chain into a competitive and rapidly responsive production and logistics system. Therefore, industrial competition within the PC industry relies not just on lower costs, but also on rapid response capabilities and exibility. In the case of TSMC, emphasis is placed on the tailored services packages provided to its customers, which include design support, cell library, SIP, quality/reliability, as well as process technology and wafer capacity. TSMC has thus dictated the new rules of the game, that foundry must go beyond manufacturing muscle to become an essential platform for its customers to gain access to across-theboard competencies. In light of all these factors, the essence of IT application is to facilitate networked rms participating in setting the rules of the game for industrial competition, preferably in the international arena.
